

To Research, Document & Promote Vietnamese-American Culture

NEWSLETTER # 64


FEBRUARY 2014

A COUNTRY STAYS ALIVE WHEN ITS CULTURE IS ALIVE.

- SACEI Newsletter updates you on the latest news about Vietnamese-America.
- It serves as a LINK between SACEI members and those who are interested in the Vietnamese or Vietnamese-American culture.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

Year of the Horse	1
Ky Uc Huynh Van Lang	2
Was VN War Just...	3
Dr. Bui Tri Trong	4
Losing Vietnam	4
The Food of Vietnam	4
In Memoriam: Ha Thanh	4
Need to Know...Return to Vietnam	5



Happy New Year

THE YEAR OF THE HORSE

January 31, 2014 marks the first day of the 2014 lunar calendar year.

Horses--be they mythical winged stallions, racing models, plow pullers, gallant hurdle jumpers, studs, mares, foals, ponies--are extremely popular animals. Likewise, people born in Horse years are amiable, pleasant, and likable creatures.

When it comes to love, Horses easily fall, and they typically get their hearts broken. Horses are also likely to have money issues.

Horses could be arrogant when they work under pressure. Although they could multi-task, they tend to get scattered with resulting unproductive and incomplete tasks. They are very strict when it comes to regulations. Horses are trustworthy individuals who will not let you down when you have problems. As a friend, they will be there to cheer you up and they'll even take you to great places just to ease out your sadness.

You will not regret hanging around with a Horse as a friend or as a lover. He will be there for you as long as you need him. Unselfish, he is willing to give you all his support. He is also fun to be with and you will expect no dull moments while being with him. He will take you to great places and will introduce you to every friend he knows of. He will try to make you feel like you belong in his own world.

Famous people who were born under the Year of the Horse are Cindy Crawford, Halle Berry, Robin Wright Peen and Aretha Franklin. Year of the Horse falls on the years; 2014, 2002, 1990, 1978, 1966, 1954 and 1942.

Ký Ức Huỳnh Văn Lang (II): Memoirs

Huỳnh Văn Lang is a 92 year-old artist, author (more than 10 books), former game hunter, teacher, founder of the Bach Khoa Binh Dan (Popular Cultural School) and the Hunting Association of Vietnam, former businessman, politician and President Diem cabinet member.

*A BOOK REVIEW by NGHIA M. VO
President Diem as seen by Prof. Huỳnh Văn Lang*



It is a privilege and an honor for me to come here to talk to you about two topics: President Diem and author Huỳnh Văn Lang. Although I have read about President Diem for many years, Mr. Lang has provided me with additional information about the president.

Below are a few stories about President Diem taken from the author's book.

In August 1954, while still studying economics at the University of Chicago, the author and five other people were asked to return to Vietnam to form a "brain trust" to assist designated Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm. Upon his return, however, Mr. Lang was given one project after another, each project being as interesting as the other, although it was nowhere close the promised "brain trust." Three months later, he opened an adult educational school and delved into popular cultural education while directing the Exchange Office.

In the early years (1954-1956), the two brothers Diem-Nhu were able to solve major national problems without the help of anyone--if there were help, they did not feel it to be important--to the point that it had become a routine for both of them to work by themselves.

These two gifted politicians made the same error of trusting their political acumen instead of the administrative system they had laid down to govern the country. Therefore, the author called it a personalistic regime rather than a family dictatorship.

From then on, the regime no longer relied on talent or political administration, but on the ability of its personnel. On many occasions, Mr. Nhu told the author, "Everything is dumped on me; it is so sad." That is correct because he was the one who created this irresponsible situation; having chosen irresponsible people, the latter had become irresponsible and always wanted to hide things, even normal ones.

In the eight years I worked for the government, the Diem cabinet had changed four times and each time its political expertise had gotten worse. From Tran Huu Phuong who was an graduate Engineer from the Ponts et Chaussees School in Paris, it went to Ha Van Vuong who knew nothing and then to Nguyen Luong, a big zero who owed his position of Finance Minister to Mme Nhu.

In 1960, four cabinet ministers resigned almost simultaneously. They were the Interior minister Lam Le Trinh; the Justice minister Nguyen Van Si; the Defense Minister Tran Trung Dung; and the Information Minister Tran Chanh Thanh. These four men were the pillars of the regime because they had built it up from the time the President was only Prime Minister. Although no one had mentioned it, one could see the beginning of the rotting of the Ngo regime.

The above four ministers were battling against three other ministers: Nguyen Dinh Thuan, minister attached to the Office of the Presidency; the Finance minister Nguyen Luong; and the Secret Service Bureau Chief Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen. These three ministers instead of controlling each other, collaborated and colluded with each other causing a big tragedy to the Ngo regime.

The reason President Diem chose Nguyen Dinh Thuan was that the latter was able to satisfy an unmarried President, who was prone to bursts of anger and demanded immediate answers, although they could be incomplete, if not totally wrong.



Prof. Huỳnh Văn Lang

If there was always a woman behind all major stories, this was no exception with the lottery story. Her name was Le Thi Tuat, also known as Mme Duc Loi in the business world because before moving to South Vietnam in 1954, she owned a store named Duc Loi in Hanoi. In California in the 1980-1990's, she was found to be an embedded financial trader for the communists.

The National Lottery was run by the Bureau of Reconstruction and Travel attached to the Office of the Presidency. All profits were used to build low-income housing for the poor and government employees. In order to become a general distributor of the lottery tickets, one had to bid for them. With each ticket costing 10 dong, a bidding of 9.50 would usually secure the winning bid.

In reality, the bidding committee included people working for ministers Thuan, Luong, and Tuyen. The latter could pick which bidder would eventually win the contest and Mme Duc Loi had worked with them for many years. The lottery story was somehow leaked to the other four ministers who opened an investigation and finally wrote a memo to Diem detailing the charges with extensive documentation and proof. During a meeting with accused and accusers, Diem became livid and threw the dossier on the faces of the accused. Then came Nhu who gathered the documents and disappeared.

Continue on next page

Ky Uc Huynh Van Lang... continued

In the end, the four ministers who brought charges resigned one after another, everyone for a different reason. Later Mr. Thuan turned out to be a French intelligence officer and in 2000, he was also known to be employed by the CIA.

The second act of the lottery affair came almost two years later in July 1962 when Mme Duc Am, the author's mother-in-law was jailed. The author did some investigation and found that Mme Duc Loi along ten other women including Mme Duc Am, were arrested for overpricing and selling lottery tickets from 10 to 15 dong. Although the police was after Mme Duc Loi, they found in her possession a small booklet containing the names of the other ten women. It turned out that the latter were just providing loans to Mme Duc Loi, but not directly involved in fixing ticket price.

The author wrote a memo to President Diem detailing all the events. Diem called him in for a meeting the following day.

"He [Diem] held my note in his hand and read it. He then took an already lit cigarette from an ash tray, brought to his mouth, inhaled two or three times, blew the smoke up and watched it. I noticed his sadness and realized he also had been shaken up for a long time. The November 11, 1960 putsch and the February 27, 1960 bombing of the Independence Palace had saddened him quite a bit and affecting me at the same time. And the lottery affair had involved his own trusted people. I believe he trusted me for later on, he had Mme Duc Am and the other women released, except for Mme Duc Loi."

After four or five minutes of silence, I saw sadness spreading to his face as he tried to talk to him rather than me,

"There is no way Mr. Thuan took money from people. He told me he had only a pair of shirts to wear."

I left a moment later feeling insecure, not for me but for the President. I felt he was totally pushed from people from the outside as well as from inside... I saw him a couple more times, although he kept a distance from me.

"In the past nine years," the author concluded, "I have met a person, if not a hero of the country, at least an extraordinary man with a few human defects, but also a TRUE person among the most imposing personalities in the country; he was of course much better than the vulgar "old patriot" HCM.

I would like to stop right here to ask you to read more stories like this one in the HUYNH VAN LANG MEMOIRS, an 840 page long book that is well written, comprehensive, and detailed about the First and Second Republics. Thank you.

Presented at the Virginia Vietnamese Senior Association, Fairfax, VA on January 4, 2014.

Was the Vietnam War a Just War?: Nguyen Ngoc Tan

III. WAS THE VIETNAM WAR A JUST WAR?: NGUYEN NGOC TAN

Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Tan is a researcher and scholar who is retired now and living in Melbourne, Australia. He obtained a PhD degree in Political Science from Monash University, Australia and is the author of *The Vietnam War Revisited: A Revolutionary View of US Foreign Policy*.

Speech delivered at Centre for Asian Studies, The University of Adelaide

5th April, 2013

By Nguyen Ngoc Tan Ph.D.

The VN War must be understood as two completely different wars, one was the civil war between two Vietnamese factions, fighting for the control of the country; the other was the US intervention in Vietnam in the context of the Cold War, seeking to alter the global balance of power. They were different in nature, means, political objectives, as well as in their arenas. For example, while Hanoi had only one foreign policy - Indochina, Washington conducted a global intervention by the US from the perspective of world peace. In this seminar, we focus only on the American war to find out whether the US intervention in Vietnam was justifiable.

A- The situation

The reality is that sixty years ago (1954), while the Cold War was in progress, the United States intervened in Vietnam's internal affairs at a time when Vietnamese nationalists in the South had been fighting a Vietnamese communist invasion from the North. The Americans (by whom I mean pro-Chinese pragmatist politicians) were concerned about a potential nuclear war, Soviet global communism and Chinese intervention. They assumed responsibility for world leadership and came to Vietnam "to liquidate the civil war in a way that did not affect their entire international position." In the process, they found it necessary to replace the legitimate nationalist government in Saigon with the communist government (the DRV) in Hanoi. This regime has since ruled a unified Vietnam.

Slogans such as "The NLF was South Vietnamese who have risen up to overthrow the Saigon corrupted and puppet dictatorship", "Saigon is a phantom government", were displayed around the world. In Australia, for example, the slogan "For peace in Vietnam, recognise the PRG," was written on the wall".

What, then, was really the political goal of the anti-war movement? Was it to bring Americans troops home? If it was, why did it continue to operate after the US withdrawal? Like the Buddhist movement in VN, they continued their fight until the removal of the Saigon government

Continue on page 5

Dr. Bui Tri Trong: Engineering Astronaut

Trong dreamed of becoming a pilot.

He said: "I always enjoyed jet fighters and wanted to be a pilot. As a child, I was always proud to be the first child in the village, by looking at the style and hearing the sound of the engine, determining the exact type of aircraft that flew over our village."

However, due to limited eyesight, he is unable to pursue the ambition. So, he decided to pursue aerospace engineering to work close to what he wished.

With all the will and hard work, he received an engineer and then master degree in aeronautical engineering from the California Polytechnic University. Next, he received a doctorate in astronaut engineering at the Stanford University. In 1988, while attending the master's level, he had internships at NASA and quickly demonstrated his capacity there.

Until 1990, when he got the master's degree, he officially worked for NASA. Initially, he worked on the air inlets and air pipes on the rocket.

In 1997, he made important contributions in the project on advanced control technology on F-15 fighters.

After that, he repeatedly left many imprints on the development of improved rockets, especially thrust. Through contributions at NASA, he has turned his dream into a reality, creating a breakthrough in aeronautical engineering.

Another Vietnamese expert who is successful at NASA is Dr. Bui Tri Trong. In 1979, he left Vietnam at the age of 14 and began the arduous days in the foreign land. Inherently, right from his childhood,




Losing Vietnam: General Ira Hunt

In *Losing Vietnam*, Major General Ira A. Hunt Jr. chronicles the efforts of U.S. military and State Department officials who argued that severe congressional budget reductions ultimately would lead to the defeat of both Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hunt details the catastrophic effects of reduced funding and of conducting "wars by budget."

This detailed and fascinating work highlights how analytical studies provided to commanders and staff agencies improved decision making in military operations. By assessing allied capabilities and the strength of enemy operations, Hunt effectively demonstrates that America's lack of financial support and resolve doomed Cambodia and South Vietnam to defeat.

Available on Amazon:

<http://www.amazon.com/Losing-Vietnam-Abandoned-Southeast-Campaigns-ebook/dp/B00AEV86T2/>




The Food of Vietnam: Luke Nguyen

cover the people and recipes that have endeared Vietnam to the millions of travelers who visit each year. Luke Nguyen's *Vietnam* follows his trip from northern Vietnam down to the south, through marketplaces and kitchens of strangers and family alike to find the best recipes Vietnam has to offer. Luke records his experiences with the people he meets and the places he visits along the way, breathing life into the classic recipes of Vietnam, from pho to banh mi and everything in between. Luke Nguyen's *Vietnam* is a culinary showcase of Vietnam filled with heartwarming stories, breathtaking location shots, and mouthwatering food photography—a must-have cookbook that will be treasured for years to come.

A beautifully packaged cookbook and highly personal culinary and cultural journey through the diverse regions of Vietnam. Join Luke Nguyen on a culinary and cultural journey through the country of his heritage to discover

Available on Amazon:

<http://www.amazon.com/The-Food-Vietnam-Luke-Nguyen/dp/1742706207/>



In Memoriam: Ha Thanh (1940-2013)

the pre-1975 years. After she moved to the US in 1975, she stopped singing although continued to produce a few CDs. Her husband, a lieutenant colonel in the ARVN cavalry force ended up in reeducation camp for many years before reuniting with her in 1990.

Born Tran Thi Luc Ha in Thua Thien, central Vietnam, she was a known singer with an unusually melodic and nostalgic voice during



<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nKG7zeoV3Pk>
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_7xL4QgXIM
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hp4gPhay4GY>
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8tNQKkJBC>
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hWH9APKR_U

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJBsWL2gGf0>
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XvnEcXlqnWs>
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FkfhQ8ykgaY>
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WolDj5hHe-I>
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kdvngnllbyg>

What Viet-Americans Need to Know When They Return to Vietnam: A Dinh Hung Report

Artist Dinh Hung was given a visa by the Hanoi government to visit his hospitalized mother in Saigon last July. At Tan Son Nhut Airport, his wife was waived by while they held him for three hours during which he was harassed and then kicked out of the country even though he had been granted a visa. His only "crime" in the U.S. has been to participate in various overseas organizations as a musician and entertainer. In Saigon, the airport Cong An showed him pictures of him participating in these organizations and gave him two options: 1. He could visit Saigon if he works for two hours a day at one of the government agencies during his stay and he should withdraw from all overseas activities, and 2. He could sign a printed document in which he acknowledged being "guilty" against the communist government and be expelled immediately. He took the second option and was expelled from Vietnam while his wife continued on with her trip without being advised about his expulsion. He was "terrified" by the incident, but did call her from Taiwan and told her about the expulsion. On the day she returned to the U.S., she was shown pictures detailing her participation in overseas organizations.

Dinh Hung, therefore, suggests that:

1. Those who had once participated in overseas organizations and had returned to Vietnam, are now working for the Hanoi government in some function or another,
2. Those who wish to freely return to Vietnam are forced by Hanoi to withdraw from participating in overseas organizations,
3. He urges those who had sworn to "Fatherland, Duty, Honor" [South Vietnamese credo] to wake up, reform, and not stab overseas fighters in the back.



<http://youtu.be/6YQGSfph4nw>

Was the Vietnam War a Just War?: Nguyen Ngoc Tan... continued

A unified Vietnam under communist rule and in China's sphere of influence was, in fact, the status-quo stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Accords. It was this action to restore the existing state of affairs that permitted the United States to assemble an alliance of Western industrial democracies and enlist China's co-operation. As a result, Soviet communism was contained and isolated, and eventually the USSR was unable to engage in economic competition. In the end, the USA won the Cold War and world peace was preserved.

This status-quo in Vietnam had, in fact, been architected by US Foreign Minister Foster Dulles in the 1954 Geneva Accords, and it was successfully restored by Dr. Henry Kissinger via the 1973 Paris Accords, during the administration of President Nixon.

International lawyers have held that intervention is excusable, if not strictly legal, when it is undertaken to preserve the balance of power. At that time, the US intervention in Vietnam appeared to be justifiable because it is clear that the American objective was to restore the status-quo in Indochina and preserve world peace. It was also clear that peace for Indochina was vital to US national security interests in the Cold War because it was a primary condition that allowed Washington to open a dialogue with Peking. In addition, the US had to take on the responsibility of world leadership if it was to be able to assemble the alliance of industrial democracies with China's co-operation; and this overall strategy was dedicated to winning the Cold War. Thus critics of the original containment policy appeared to be unrealistic when they argued that "Vietnam was too far away for the US to claim its national security interest."

B- The dissents within the protest movements

However, in the aftermath of the war or to be precise, after the Nixon administration took on the responsibility of ending the war and extricating the Americans from Vietnam under honourable terms, dissents associated with the protest movements appeared and resurrected the argument of the Liberals, strenuously advocating that it was an unjust war and asserting that the US should not have been there in the first place. In his book *"How did Americong help the Vietcong to defeat the common enemy: America?"*, Dr Roger Canfield recorded that: "Consider the near universal effusive accounts of the peace movement, portraying idealistic youth and honest pacifists rightfully protesting an illegal and immoral war by US imperialism against innocent peasants in a faraway place of no strategic interest to the United States."

We all still remember the slogans disseminated by protest movements such as "Saigon is a corrupt and dictatorial government", "We are on the wrong side", "This is an unwinnable war," "We should not have been there in the first place". In general, they urged the Nixon administration to withdraw the US troops out of Vietnam unconditionally. At first glance, that seemed to be the only objective the anti-war and peace movements were after.

However, after the US troops had withdrawn out of Vietnam (1972), the peace movement continued to work for the replacement of the Saigon anti-communist government with a communist government.

Continue on next page

was completed.

Though their claims were controversial, their slogans did exert a powerful impact on the strategy to discredit the legitimacy of the Saigon nationalist government for the recognition of the PRG, which was in fact, an instrument of the Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi. Thus, it could be argued that another objective of the protest movement was also the replacement of the legitimate nationalist government in Saigon with the DRV in Hanoi.

In retrospect, it is interesting to find that the goal of the peace movement is coincided with two tactical goals of the Nixon's overall strategy in Vietnam: "To extricate the US from Vietnam (but) under honourable terms and restore the 1954 Geneva Accords status-quo," with the intended outcome being an Indochinese "buffer zone" under the sphere of influence of China. Yet, a major component of this process was to bring down the nationalist government of South Vietnam in order to recognise the communist government in Hanoi as a legitimate government of a unified Vietnam. From this follow the questions: "Was there a systematic link between the Nixon administration and the protest movement? And what purpose was it for?"

C- The Nixon Administration's overall strategy

My answer to the 1st question is "yes" because the protest movement was one of six components of the overall Nixon strategy which had been foreshadowed as early as in mid 1950s by Dr Henry Kissinger:

To extricate the US from VN under honourable condition;

to confine the dissent of the protest movement to Indochina;

to seize the high ground of the peace issue by a strategy that demonstrated to the American public that, even while pursuing the Cold War, the administration would do its utmost to control its dangers and gradually to overcome it;

to broaden the diplomatic chessboard to including China in the international system;

to strengthen our alliance;

and, from that platform, to go on the diplomatic offensive, especially in the Middle East.

The second component clearly reveals that the dissent of the protest movement was a part of the Nixon administration's overall strategy. And this fact is undisputed.

But what did the administration use it for? The Nixon team did not believe the Cold War could be won in one grand assault, but rather by a complex strategy destined to achieve their objective in a series of stages. And the "Saigon problem" belonged to the very first stage of Nixon's overall strategy to contain the Soviets. For this reason, in order to achieve the objective of the fourth stage, the removal of the anti-communist government in Saigon had been considered to be the fundamental condition needed to assure the overall success of the strategy. In other words, the restoration of the status quo of the 1954 Geneva Accords - meaning the removal of the Saigon government - was a US vital interest, a key to opening China to the West, and the road to the final victory.

While the "Saigon problem" played a vital role in the long range American foreign policy, the proposed removal of Saigon was involved:

Scuttling an ally to appease an enemy;

Eliminating a legitimate independent nation state which had been recognised by more than eighty nations and was a member of the United Nations.

US strategists were quite well aware of the moral issues involved. It was even ascertained that "... to achieve our objective in stages, each of which by definition was bound to fall short of the ultimate ideal and could therefore be castigated as insufficiently moral." Yet Dr Kissinger determined to overcome this problem: he described the Saigon problem as only a "temporary weakness," not a tragedy at all. This raised the question of just how he was to achieve the Nixon administration's overall strategy objective without being castigated as "insufficiently moral"? The Nixon team had to find a political evolution to overcome all the shortcomings associated with the abandonment of the Saigon government.

In practice, Dr Kissinger came up with a well-thought tactic based on a pragmatic perspective which the Nixon team called it "a viable foreign policy" that would help dissociate the Nixon administration from all the perceived shortcomings and all blame for having scuttled the Saigon government of South Vietnamese ally to appease the Hanoi government." In fact, with this policy, the Nixon team would be able to blame the Saigon tragedy and the violation of the 1973 Paris Accords on the protest movement, on either Saigon or Hanoi, on the opposition or even on the US Congress.

The co-called "viable policy" was composed of two major components: "Decent Interval and Vietnamisation". The political evolution of the "**Decent Interval**" allowed the Nixon team a decent time span to prepare for the removal of the Saigon government at the request of Hanoi, and then directed all the blame on to the Saigon regime and its military forces for having been incompetent.

The "**Vietnamisation**" strategy allowed the US Congress to pull out the props from under Saigon, which consequently altered the balance of military power in favour of Hanoi; Hanoi was later blamed for violating the international agreement when it overthrew the Saigon government by military forces (but in reality having been directed by Dr. Kissinger's political evolution).

On the policy level, it had been decided that the goal of assisting South Vietnam to hold on a stalemated war and the unlimited time span required to develop democratic institutions, was unrealistic and beyond the perseverance of the American public.

In fact, the pursuit of the Cold War objective and the limits to the perseverance of the American public both required a timeframe which would not be compatible with the unlimited time span required for conducting a protracted war in South Vietnam. The US strategists would not hold on to the Saigon government because the delay involved would undermine the US effort to open China to the West and hence foil the whole political and diplomatic process of the Cold War strategy, especially the US diplomatic effort in the Middle East.

How did Kissinger overcome the Saigon problem of “scuttling an ally to appease an enemy” without being criticised as “betrayal”? The secret that contributed to Dr Kissinger’s brilliant success was nothing but the protest movement. Dr. Kissinger used it to rally public support, both domestic and international, for overcoming obstacles to the realisation and legitimising of their tactics **to achieve the goal of real peace** and eventually to win the Cold War. He “confined the dissent of the protest movement to Indochina” then manipulated it as a tool to absorb all the shortcomings of the Saigon tragedy which he had treated only as a “temporary weakness”; and once it was overcome, he could broaden the diplomatic Cold War chessboard to include China to the alliance of Western industrial democracies he had assembled earlier. As a result, the Soviet Union became isolated from the rest of the world and trapped in economic incompetence.

In terms of achievement, the Nixon administration’s weapons - of a flexible diplomacy supported by a strong national defence and sound economic competition - won the Cold War. The threat of a nuclear war was fading, the Soviet global communism was contained and Chinese intervention was deterred. And based on international laws, the intervention was excusable because its objective was dedicated to the restoration of the 1954 Geneva Accords and peace for Indochina.

In fact, the objective of US intervention in Vietnam was to honour the commitment that US Foreign Minister Foster Dulles made at the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Accords that “The United States will not do anything to upset the status-quo.” The American war should on these grounds be regarded as a just war.

All things considered, the Saigon problem was decided on the basis of strategic necessity because it was a US vital interest in the pursuit of the Cold War objective. Pacifists of the peace movement boasted that “South Vietnam would have a better life under communist rule. Look at Vietnam under communist rule today and ask “What would have happened to Southeast Asia and the world, if the US had had moral scruples and not intervened in Vietnam in 1954 when the spread of Soviet communism seemed unstoppable?” And in the interests of the survival of the human community and world peace, should America’s policy in Vietnam have been described as illegal and immoral? Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience.

1. The White House, Washington, Memorandum for H A. Kissinger from Winston Lord. Subject: Memcon of your conversation with Chou En Lai, July 29, 1971. Declassified September 5, 2001. Edited by W. Burr May 26, 2006. Reproduced at the National Security Archive. [from here cited as Memo for Kissinger]. “We came to Vietnam to liquidate the civil war in a way that did not affect our entire international situation. . . Any intervention in our domestic politics has two consequences. First, it forces us to react much more violently than we would have in normal circumstances; and second, it has consequences which go far beyond Vietnam and therefore make it a much more general problem than just the Vietnam problem.
2. Wight Martin 1986, *Power Politics*, 2nd edition, England, p.196
3. At the Conference of the Big Four in 1954, via USSR Foreign Minister Molotov, Mao proposed that “In order to satisfy China’s security needs, Mao requested that Indochina, the region along the Southern border of China, be turned into a buffer state under the Chinese influence.”
4. Kissinger, Henry, 1999, “I, Henry”, *Australian Financial Review*, May.
5. Dr. Canfield Roger, 2011, “Peace, Politics and Military Strategy, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and China”. Presented at UN Symposium, Vietnam Centre, Texas Tech, March 12, 2011. www.americong.com
6. Tuong Quang Luu, AO, 2009, “Journeys from Vietnam: A Vietnamese Australian’s Reflection”. Speech delivered at The Sydney Institute, Sydney, Tuesday 3rd March, 2009. Tuong Quang Luu, a former Vietnamese diplomat, has provided an eye-witness account of how the Peace Movement contributed to the final communist victory in the denouement of the Vietnam War. He said “We all remember this writing on the wall at various places in capital cities of Australia: “For Peace in Vietnam, recognise the PRG”.
7. Thayer, Carlyle, 1989, *War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam, 1954-1960*, Australia: Allen & Unwin Ltd. p. 15.
8. Kissinger, Henry, 1999, *Op cit.* p.1. Kissinger wrote: “The strategy adopted by the Nixon administration to extricate America was foreshadowed in an article I had written for *Foreign Affairs* magazine while still a professor at Harvard [1955].”
9. *Ibid*
10. *Ibid*. Dr Kissinger even asserted that “We would not however, leave the country for which nearly 40,000 Americans had died by turning over to communist rule tens of millions who had staked their lives on our word.”
11. Nixon, Richard, 1999, *Victory Without War*, New York: Simon & Schuster, p.108. The Nixon team blamed the Saigon tragedy on the anti-war movement, press bias, and Congress. According to President Richard Nixon, the Liberal Congress also made sure the manpower required for the program (Vietnamisation) would never come by the War Power Act in 1974, which legislated that US forces be pulled out of Indochina, even though “the law was not only unconstitutional but also unsound.” Also see Nguyen Ngoc Tan, 2012, *The Vietnam War Revisited: A Revolutionary View of US Foreign Policy*, Westminister: Vietnamese in Diaspora, p.120.
12. Tapes recorded President Nixon’s conversations with Dr Kissinger were released in August 2004 by Miller Center of Public Affairs, Virginia University. President Nixon asked Dr Kissinger “Can we have a viable policy, in the case the North Vietnamese invaded South Vietnam within a year or two from now.” Dr Kissinger: “If in one or two years from now, the North took over the South, we can have a viable foreign policy if it’s a result of South Vietnam’s incompetence.” The time span stated in the conversation referred to the “decent interval” from the signing of the Paris Accords, January 1973 to the collapse of Saigon in April 1975.
13. *Ibid*
14. *Ibid*; also see Nixon, Richard, 1999.